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1 Introduction
A recurrent feature of the international monetary system over the past 150
years has been the use of fixed exchange rates to anchor currency values and
prices. Fixed exchange rates have some macroeconomic benefits (Edwards et al.
2003; Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner 2003; Husain et al. 2005), but abandoning a
fixed-exchange rate regime is one of the most frequently observed policy decisions
in open-economy macroeconomics (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995; Reinhart and Rogoff
2009). This decision is frequently followed by a currency devaluation, which can
result in significant reductions in employment and output (Kaminsky and Reinhart
1999; Gupta et al. 2007). Given the fragility of fixed exchange rates, countries often
turn to hard pegs and currency unions. But as shown by Schmukler and Serve´n
(2002) and Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015), even hard pegs have rarely been
viewed as credible arrangements by financial markets.
In this paper, we illustrate one reason why countries abandon pegs and devalue
their currencies: shocks to the value of their output. We take the perspective that
fixed exchange rates are often adopted to facilitate external trade, and explore how
exogenous fluctuations in export prices affect the probability of expected currency
devaluation. To do so, we first solve a long-run model with flexible prices where
a government chooses an optimal policy by weighing the costs and benefits of
abandoning a fixed exchange rate. The cost of floating is that trade is lower outside
of a fixed exchange-rate regime, reducing government tax revenues and increasing
fiscal pressure.1 The benefit of floating is that, in real terms, the government faces
1There are a variety of reasons why trade may be larger under a peg, including lower exchange
rate volatility and transaction costs. The empirical literature on the classical gold standard
suggests that trade was larger under pegs due to transactions costs (Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner,
2003).
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lower domestic-currency debt payments following devaluation, reducing the real
debt burden and easing fiscal pressure. Optimal policy balances these two effects
for a fixed level of debt and a fixed devaluation.
The main contribution of the model is to highlight how permanent shocks
to the international price of exports affect the probability of leaving a currency
peg. When export prices are sufficiently low, the costs of a reduction in trade
after leaving the peg are small and offset by the fixed benefit from lower real-debt
payments following devaluation. If export-price shocks are permanent, a negative
price shock will increase the probability that export prices are sufficiently low in
the future to induce a peg exit, and therefore cause an immediate increase in
currency risk. We solve this structural model of abandoning a peg in closed form
to show how negative (positive) shocks to the price of a country’s exports increase
(decrease) the probability of leaving a peg and devaluing its currency.
We then show empirically, using both structural and reduced-form models,
that this mechanism is relevant for “pegxit pressure” using currency risk, a closely
followed indicator of expected currency devaluation by economic agents, policy
makers, and market participants. We employ novel high-frequency panel data that
includes monthly measures of commodity and manufactured goods world prices,
countries’ principal exports, and currency risk, measured from market expecta-
tions, for more than 40 years and 21 countries to test whether export-price shocks
influence currency risk.
Our sample period, 1870-1913, is a particularly well-suited laboratory for un-
derstanding why countries abandon hard pegs for several reasons. First, many
2
countries pegged to gold to facilitate trade.2 Second, both capital and goods
markets were unfettered and integrated (Eichengreen, 1998). Finally, many coun-
tries, particularly those in the periphery, had relatively unspecialized production
structures, exposing them to external trade shocks that were plausibly exoge-
nous (Williamson, 2013). Trade in this early era of globalization is well described
by the Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage in factor endowments.3
Since many countries specialized in exports of raw materials and minerals, we
are able to exploit the so-called “commodity lottery” in our identification strat-
egy. That is, commodity prices determined in world markets provide a reasonably
exogenous source of variation for measuring the benefits of fixed exchange rates
since countries specialized in exporting products based on their pre-determined
factor endowments. We focus on the prices of the principal export, instead of
export prices or terms-of-trade, as a way to isolate exogenous monthly variation
and identify the causal impact of the principal-export price on currency risk under
fixed exchange rates.4
Our empirical analysis shows a negative and statistically significant causal re-
lationship between the price of principal exports and currency risk, a result that
is robust to alternative specifications, including those with country and year fixed
effects that account for omitted covariates. Furthermore, we show that the ef-
2See, for example, Eichengreen (1998), Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner (2003), Mitchener and
Weidenmier (2008), Mitchener et al. (2010), Mitchener and Voth (2011).
3See Blattman et al. (2007), Findlay and O’Rourke (2003), Mitchener and Yan (2014) and
O’Rourke and Williamson (1994).
4An alternative empirical strategy would be to predict departures from the gold standard
using principal-export prices. However, as we later show in Table 11 shows, there were only a
few “pegxits” before this international monetary system was abandoned in 1914. Instead, we
focus on currency risk spreads since they measure expected currency devaluation, which for pegs,
includes the probability of abandoning gold as well as changes in the value of currency following
exit.
3
fects are driven by countries in the periphery rather than the core countries of the
gold standard. In particular, for a periphery country that is formally on gold, we
find that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the annual growth rate of principal-
export prices increases the currency risk spread by 8 basis points.5
The main contribution of our paper is to identify a novel mechanism, both
theoretically and empirically, that explains the dynamics of currency risk. This
research contributes to the large literature on how unsustainable pegs collapse,
where it is often difficult to perform causal inference. First-generation models of
currency crises highlight a fiscal mechanism where government expenditures need
to be financed with inflation-related revenues (for example, seigniorage), but in-
flation is incompatible with fixed exchange rates under capital mobility (Krugman
1979; Flood and Garber 1984; Calvo 1987; Broner 2008).6 However, government
expenditure shocks are frequently endogenous or coincide with other shocks such
as wars, natural disasters and policy shifts, making it challenging to identify, em-
pirically, how important this fiscal mechanism is in driving currency risk.7 To
address this identification issue, we focus on a model and an estimation strategy
that turns to fiscal shocks emanating from the revenue side of the ledger. Do-
ing so allows us to identify a plausibly exogenous source of variation in revenues,
5From a trader’s perspective, small differences in spreads can lead to large profits. Our
objective is not to explain the cross-section of currency risk spreads, which is much larger in
magnitude. Rather, we aim to uncover the causal effect of realized price fluctuations on currency
risk spreads, on top of other factors that are already priced in.
6Another class of models, known as second-generation models, shows that crises can be unpre-
dictable and caused by self-fulfilling expectations, often independently of fundamentals (Obstfeld
1986; Angeletos et al. 2007). So-called third-generation models explore how the financial sector
interacts with currency crises and how these crises propagate into the real economy. Examples
include Corsetti et al. (1999), Krugman (1999) and Aghion et al. (2004).
7In related theoretical contributions, Rebelo and Ve´gh (2008) study optimal policy when there
are output costs from abandoning a peg, while Aizenman and Glick (2008) show that a fixed
exchange rate can lead to a costly exit following a large enough adverse real shock.
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global commodity-price shocks, which can be causally tested to see whether they
influence the decision to abandon a peg.8
We also contribute to the literature on the the optimality of exchange-rate
regimes in response to real and nominal shocks (Kollmann 2002; Gali and Monacelli
2005; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2016). We identify the response of currency risk
to an exogenous real shock during the classical gold standard (Chernyshoff et al.,
2009), which suggests that price fluctuations in a country’s principal export(s)
impose limits on using fixed exchange rates as a commitment device (Bordo and
Rockoff 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). Our study shows that debt and real
shocks put a strain on existing institutions. Flandreau et al. (1998) document
that fluctuations in the cost of servicing debt affected the stability of the European
countries during the gold standard. We study a similar mechanism, but focus on
country-specific export-price shocks. In that sense, our results are also related to
the literature on the trilemma (Obstfeld et al., 2005). In an environment of perfect
capital mobility, we document that country-specific external shocks that change
the relative value of monetary autonomy affect the probability of exchange-rate
instability.
Finally, our study contributes to the understanding of the operation and per-
formance of the classical gold standard in the periphery. Economic historians have
noted how the gold standard influenced trade flows and how terms-of-trade shocks
influenced the pace and pattern of economic development; however, to our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first to analyze and account for how trade shocks affected the
8See Kaminsky et al. (1998) for a survey of empirical work on predictors of currency crises for
the late 20th century. Tables A1 and A4 in Kaminsky et al. (1998) report that only one study
considers export prices (Kamin, 1988). No studies cited in this survey consider the price of the
principal exogenous export.
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durability of the gold standard on the periphery.9 That said, our focus on shocks
to a country’s principal-export price is related to earlier work including Blattman
et al. (2007), Williamson (2008) and Reinhart et al. (2016), and our contribution is
to relate the effects of principal-export price shocks to currency risk. Further, the
role of debt is related to the work of Bordo and Meissner (2006), which documents
that an important share of public debt was denominated in domestic currency. The
mechanism through which export prices affect currency risk in our model works
through the reduction of real payments of debt denominated in domestic currency
but, more generally, it applies also to other sources of inflation-related revenues,
including seigniorage and the reduction of real payments on nominal government
contracts and wages.
2 Model
This section derives a simple, long-run model of endogenous currency risk with
flexible prices. Capital markets are assumed to be frictionless. All agents have
perfect information and are risk neutral. All variables are measured in terms of
the numeraire, and to relate it later to the empirical setting, we assume that issued
currency is backed by gold in order to fix exchange rates.
2.1 Production and prices
Consider a small, open economy, producing an amount, y, of a tradable good
with a price, Pt, that is exogenous to the economy and determined in international
9See Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner (2003), Estevadeordal et al. (2003), Flandreau and Maurel
(2005), Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) and Mitchener et al. (2010).
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markets. For simplicity, we abstract from output growth and focus on the produc-
tion of a single tradable good.10 We further assume that PPP holds. The price of
the tradable good fluctuates according to the following process:
dPt = µPtdt+ σPtdZt, P0 > 0, (1)
where µ and σ represent constant mean and volatility of the commodity price
growth rate, and Zt is a wiener process. In other words, Pt follows a geometric
Brownian motion with percentage drift µ and volatility σ.
2.2 Government
The government appropriates a constant fraction τ of tradable output as tax
revenues and has a subjective discount factor given by ρ, which is also the risk-free
rate. The expected discounted value of fiscal revenue from potential output at
t = 0 is given by τP0y
ρ−µ . We consider a government that issues debt at t = 0 to
finance a public investment that generates a return of rg per unit of time. The
expected discounted benefit of issuing debt equals:
E
[ˆ ∞
0
rge
−ρtdt
]
=
rg
ρ
. (2)
We assume that the government issues long-term debt in the form of a perpe-
tuity of amount D with debt service C, both denominated in local currency. This
debt is not subject to default, but it is denominated in domestic currency and thus
10More generally, we could have included non-tradable goods and other tradable goods at the
expense of notational simplicity. In the model presentation, we will refer to output and exports
interchangeably, but the crucial assumption for our results is that the price of output, Pt, is
exogenously determined in world markets, independently of whether it is ultimately traded.
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subject to currency risk.11
At t = 0, the government sets a rule whereby the amount of currency issued
is directly tied to the numeraire good, gold. That is, the government promises
to keep the price level equal to the international price level of 1. However, the
government can not commit to this policy. In fact, there exists a threshold level of
export prices, P F , at which it is optimal for the government to float the currency,
which happens at time T F = inf
{
t ≥ 0|Pt ≤ P F
}
, when the international price
first falls to P F . This policy is determined endogenously based on the trade-off
between costs and benefits derived from leaving hard peg. We assume that once
the government leaves the hard peg it does not return.12 If the country floats, the
real value of the debt service goes down to C
St
, where St = S and S > 1 is the price
level after the government floats.13 This reduction in debt payments gives the
government the incentive to float. However, by increasing exchange-rate volatility
and transaction costs (Rose, 2011), it also negatively affects international trade,
11We focus our analysis on currency risk rather than country or political risk. In the empirical
section of the paper, we argue that our measure of risk premia does not include sovereign risk.
Although there is a large empirical literature indicating the existence of original sin (i.e., inability
to issue foreign debt denominated in home currency), most economies in the late 19th century,
including those on the periphery, funded part of their public debt by issuing long-term bonds in
domestic currency in the home market, if not in London. See Accominotti et al. (2011) for data
on the the share of public debt issued in home currency.
12The assumption of lack of commitment follows Bordo and Kydland (1995). We abstract
from escape clauses as our export price shocks are arguably not indicative of the emergencies
discussed in Bordo and Kydland (1995), e.g., wars. Instead, we focus on the strategic, and
irreversible, decision of the government to abandon the peg. Together with the assumptions
of flexible export prices and purchasing power parity, this means that our mechanism is driven
by long-run considerations related to trade, and not short-term considerations associated with
competitive devaluations or currency wars.
13The assumption that the currency devalues after leaving gold is motivated by the positive
and persistent currency risk premia found for this period by Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015).
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which reduces taxable output by a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1]. This is the cost of floating.14
For simplicity, we assume the government has a balanced budget. In particular,
we assume that the government can raise lump-sum taxes or give back subsidies
(Ψ) such that it does not accumulate assets or issue new debt over time:15
a˙t = ρat + τPtyt + Ψt − C = 0, fixed; (3)
a˙t = ρat + τPtyt (1− λ) + Ψt − C
S
= 0, f loating. (4)
Before providing the mathematical details to solve the model, we develop the
intuition for our main result - that an exogenous decline in the price of exports in-
creases the probability of leaving the peg and devaluing currency, while an increase
in the price of exports leads to a decline in the probability of leaving the peg and
devaluation. In other words, we show how exogenous fiscal-revenue shocks affect
currency risk. The benefit of devaluation is that the government faces lower real
domestic-currency debt payments. The cost is that abandoning a fixed exchange
rate negatively lowers external trade. Optimal policy balances these two effects
for a pre-determined amount of debt service, C, and a fixed devaluation following
the abandonment of the peg. Debt payments under fixed devaluations play an
important role in our model. Together, they imply that the benefit of abandoning
a currency peg is independent from current export prices. This contrasts with the
14One common government tax during the gold standard was import tariffs. In the model tax
revenues fluctuate with export prices, not imports. Under the assumption of balanced trade, im-
ports are equal to exports. More generally, our assumptions capture that the government obtains
tax revenues from economic activity that depends on whether the country fixes its exchange rate.
15Any payments in gold-denominated debt are included in Ψt. We focus on domestic currency
public debt since the government can not affect the real payments on gold-denominated debt
through devaluation. The assumption that the government has access to lump-sum taxes and is
running a balanced budget is done for simplicity and would not change the results in this paper.
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costs of leaving a peg which fluctuate with the international price of exports. As
a consequence, if the government leaves the peg when the price of exports is high,
it loses significant tax revenues. These costs do not compensate the fixed benefit
of abandoning the peg. On the other hand, when the price of exports declines
substantially, the cost of leaving the peg is small and is more than compensated
by the fixed benefit in the reduction of real-debt payments. Finally, if export
prices are subject to permanent shocks, then negative shocks to prices increase the
probability of reaching the lower bound on prices such that the government aban-
dons the peg. Therefore, negative shocks to export prices increase the probability
that a country leaves the peg and devalues, while the symmetric holds for positive
shocks.
2.3 Pricing sovereign debt and currency risk premia
In this section we solve for the economy’s currency risk premia. Using Ito’s
lemma, the value of public debt D satisfies:
ρD = C + µPDP +
1
2
σ2P 2DPP , (5)
which in turn can be written as:
D (P ) = A0 + A1P + A2P
X , (6)
where X is the negative root to the equation σ
2
2
X (X − 1) + µX − ρ = 0 given by
X = 1
2
− µ
σ2
−
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2ρ
σ2
< 0.16
To determine the constants A0, A1 and A2 we make use of boundary conditions.
16See Leland (1994) or Shreve (2004).
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To obtain A0 and A1, note that when P goes to infinity, the country does not leave
the peg and its domestic price level is fixed at 1. Therefore, the currency-risk
premium is zero and the value of debt is just the discounted value of present value
of real payments C:
limD (P )P→∞ =
C
ρ
. (7)
From this boundary condition we can see that A0 =
C
ρ
and A1 = 0. When
the country abandons the peg, we assumed that the domestic price level jumps to
S > 1, and that the country does not return to the peg. Then, the debt payments
following a peg are permanently reduced in real terms to C
S
, which implies that:
limD (P )P→PF =
C
ρS
. (8)
From these two boundary conditions we obtain that A2 =
C
ρ
1−S
S
(
P F
)−X
. Using
these results we can rewrite the value of the debt as:
Dt (P ) = E
[ˆ TF
t
Ce−ρ(u−t)du
]
+ E
[ˆ ∞
TF
C
S
e−ρ(u−t)du
]
=
C
ρ
[
1− S − 1
S
(
Pt
P F
)X]
, (9)
where Et
[
e−ρ(T
F−t)
]
=
(
Pt
PF
)X
. The term S−1
S
(
Pt
PF
)X
corresponds to the currency
risk premium. The market value of debt denominated in domestic currency is then
equal to a riskless perpetual bond, minus the currency risk premium associated
with devaluation. Note that P F is constant and does not depend on current
11
macroeconomic conditions.
For a given C, the currency-risk spread is given by CRSt (P ) =
C
Dt(P )
− ρ:
CRSt (Pt) = ρ
[
1
1− S−1
S
(
Pt
PF
)X − 1
]
, (10)
where ∂CRS
∂Pt
< 0. In words, lower international prices are associated with higher
risk of a country leaving the currency peg and devaluing the currency, which is
reflected in risk-neutral risk premia.17
2.4 Decision to float
In the previous section, we have priced domestically-denominated debt under
the assumption that the country floats its currency if export prices are too low.
We now solve for the optimal decision when to float and, in particular, for the
threshold level of international prices that induces a “pegxit”. First, note that the
sovereign government’s wealth can be written as:
Wt(P ) = E
[ˆ ∞
t
τPtye
−ρ(u−t)du
]
−Dt (P ) +
E
[ˆ ∞
t
rgDt (Pt) e
−ρ(u−t)du
]
− E
[ˆ ∞
TF
λτyPte
−ρ(u−t)du
]
= τ
Pty
ρ− µ −
τλyP F
ρ− µ
(
Pt
P F
)X
+
C
ρ
(
rg
ρ
− 1
)[
1− S − 1
S
(
Pt
P F
)X]
, (11)
where Et
[´∞
TF
Pte
−ρ(u−t)du
]
= Et
[
P F e−ρ(T
F−t)
]
= P F
(
Pt
PF
)X
.
17Given that X = 12 − µσ2 −
√(
1
2 − µσ2
)2
+ 2ρσ2 < 0, we can see that
∂X
∂µ < 0 and
∂X
∂σ > 0.
Furthermore, ∂CRS∂X > 0. Therefore, the higher the volatility of the international price, the larger
the spread and the lower the growth rate of the international price, the lower the currency risk.
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We assume that the government wishes to maximize its wealth. Government
wealth depends positively on tax revenues, the public investment returns, the
reduction in debt payments from devaluation, and negatively on the costs of de-
valuation and debt payments. The floating policy will be defined by a boundary
level for the international price such that the government floats the currency that
maximizes sovereign wealth. Taking first-order conditions with respect to the in-
ternational price, we obtain:
∂W
∂P
= τ
y
ρ− µ −
Xτλy
ρ− µ
(
Pt
P F
)X−1
− C
ρ
S − 1
S
(
rg
ρ
− 1
)
X
P F
(
Pt
P F
)X−1
. (12)
Using the smooth-pasting condition:
∂W
∂P P=PF
=
τy
ρ− µ (1− λ) ,
18 (13)
we obtain:
P F = C
S−1
S
(
rg
ρ
− 1
)
X (ρ− µ)
λτyρ (1−X) . (14)
Note that the export-price lower bound before a country floats its currency,
P F , depends only on parameters.19 Figure 1 shows that P F depends positively on
the risk free rate, ρ, and the currency devaluation, S. P F depends negatively on
the return to public debt, rg, the tax rate, τ , the growth rate of export prices, µ,
the volatility of the export price, σ and the output cost after leaving the peg, λ.
18This condition ensures continuity in the value of wealth at the time of devaluation.
19We take the coupon, C, and debt level, D, as given for simplicity, but we can easily solve
for the country’s debt capacity and coupon by maximizing the wealth of the country gross of the
market value of debt.
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Figure 1: Comparative Statics for export-price lower bound: ρ is risk free rate, rg is
return on public spending financed with debt, S is post-float currency devaluation,
τ is tax rate, µ is the growth rate in principal-commodity price, σ is volatility of
principal-commodity price and λ is the reduction in exports after devaluation.
Intuitively, anything that makes the post-devaluation worse, for example, higher
output costs, is associated with lower P F and a lower probability of devaluing.
Anything that improves the government’s situation following devaluation, for ex-
ample, a higher devaluation rate S, increases P F , and implies a higher probability
of devaluing.
3 Empirical Analysis
We turn now to testing empirically whether export prices have a causal impact
on currency risk, using both structural and reduced-form models.
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3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We employ a new high-frequency data set, from the classical gold standard
period, to study the impact of international-price fluctuations on currency risk.
We use weekly data on short-term interest rates to obtain monthly currency risk
spreads as in Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015). Currency risk spreads are defined
as a country’s short-term open market or bank rate, denominated in domestic
currency, minus the short-term gold denominated domestic UK trade bill. These
three-month, prime-quality trade bills are very liquid and not subject to default
risk.20 We combine these data with newly collected monthly data on the prices of
internationally-traded goods from the Economist, as well as with information on
the principal exports and imports for each of the countries in our sample.21
To identify the principal exports for each economy, we computed export weights
from data gathered by the British Board of Trade (various years), Jacobson (1909),
Mitchell (1982), Mitchell (2007a), and Mitchell (2007b). The first two publications
provide detailed information on exports and imports by product for most of the
countries in our sample between 1870 and 1909. Appendix B provides detailed
information on the sources and the method used to determine the principal export
for each country.22
The sample includes 21 economies and 8901 country-month observations span-
20See Neal and Weidenmier (2003) and Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015) for further details
on the data.
21We use end of the month observations for all variables. To maximize coverage, when the end
of the month observation is missing for currency risk we opt to use the first weekly observation
of the following month (769 observations). If that is also not available, we use the average of the
current month (13 observations). Argentina (190 observations), Greece (294 observations) and
Japan (268 observations) account for most of these instances.
22Although one of our economies is a colony (India), and another a Grand-Duchy (Finland),
we will use the words country and economy interchangeably to facilitate exposition.
15
ning January 1870 - December 1913. Table 1 summarizes the data while Table 2
reports the three principal exports of each country, with the goods rank-ordered
by their export share. As is common for the literature on the gold standard, Ta-
ble 2 also denotes whether an economy is designated as part of the “core” or the
“periphery”. Following Bordo and Flandreau (2003), we use a country’s capital
importer/exporter status and its standard of living (measured by GDP/capita) to
assign countries to one of these two groups.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Month-year 8901 1870m1 1913m12
Currency risk 8901 1.96% 2.18% -3.12% 13%
Export-Price index 8901 92.6 24.3 44.4 211.2
Export-Price index yearly growth 8748 1.07% 14.7% -50% 150%
Table 1: Summary Statistics for monthly data
Empirically testing the effects of international price shocks on currency risk re-
quires some further consideration of some of the model assumptions, in particular,
as they relate to what is exported and who exports it. First, there is substantial
variation in the principal export in different countries, but some exports are man-
ufactured goods and not commodities. Second, commodities are more important
for countries in the periphery. Economies in the core have more diversified produc-
tion structures, including substantial shares of manufactures or semi-manufactures.
These two facts suggest that the proposed mechanism identified in the model may
operate more strongly in the periphery. Exogeneity of export-price movements is
also more plausible in the periphery since specialization is largely determined by
endowments, and these are in turn driven by exogenous factors such as climate
and geography. To account for this heterogeneity, we allow estimated coefficients
16
Country Principal Exports Max (%) Core Periphery
Argentina Wool, Wheat, Beef 50 X
Austria-Hungary Timber, Sugar, Flour 23 X
Belgium Flour, Coal, Iron 15 X
Bulgaria Wheat, Barley, Animals 82 X
Chile Nitrate, Copper, Coal 81 X
Denmark Butter, Flour, Beef 65 X
Finland Timber, Tar, Pitch N/A X
France Wool mf., Silk mf., Cotton mf. 15 X
Germany Iron prod., Wool mf., Flour 15 X
Greece Iron, Olive oil, lead 30 X
India Cotton, Rice, Tea 49 X
Italy Silk, Olive oil, Hemp 49 X
Japan Silk, Tea, Rice 60 X
Mexico Silver, Coffee, Copper 84 X
Netherlands Drugs, Flour, Iron prod. 22 X
Norway Timber, Iron, Oats 52 X
Romania Wheat, Barley, Flax 59 X
Russia Wheat, Flax, Barley 31 X
Sweden Timber, Iron, Oats 49 X
Switzerland Cotton mf., Silk, Timber 24 X
USA Cotton, Wheat, Beef 34 X
Table 2: Table of countries and principal exports, rank-ordered by share of an
economy’s total exports. Max (%) represents maximum share of principal-export
weight for a particular year between 1880 - 1913, mf. stands for manufactures.
Principal exports used in baseline regression specifications are identified in bold.
For some economies the price of the principal export is not available at a monthly
level. Appendix B reports all the sources and methods used to determine the
principal exogenous exports and price series. A country is defined as part of the
core if it had an average real GDP per capita equal or larger than 2500 international
GK 1990 dollars between 1870 - 1913 (data from the Maddison Project, 2013
version), and is a capital exporter (the exception to this rule is the USA, which
was a capital importer until 1900. Denmark and Argentina both exceed the income
threshold but are capital importers for most of our sample.).
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to differ across the core and the periphery in our empirical specifications. Finally,
note that a few countries had near monopolies in the production of some goods.23
The mechanism explored in the model works through domestically-denominated
debt. Although we do not have data on the proportion of debt denominated in
domestic currency for all our 21 economies, Accominotti et al. (2011) reports that
a substantial share of foreign public debt was in fact denominated in domestic
currency, including in some economies in the periphery.24
To illustrate the mechanism, Figure 2 plots currency risk (solid line) against
the growth rate in the price of Chile’s principal exports, nitrate (dashed line)
and copper (dotted line). Consistent with the model, we can see from this figure
that Chile’s currency risk is negatively correlated with the growth rate of the
international price of copper: the correlation coefficient is -0.17 and significantly
different from zero at the 1% level.25 Turning to our sample of 21 economies,
the correlation between currency risk and the yearly growth in the price of the
23Two noteworthy cases are Chile for nitrate and the Netherlands for quinine (Peruvian bark
grown in Java.). We do not have monthly prices for Peruvian bark, and use the Netherlands’
second largest export instead. Note that the Netherlands pose an additional challenge related
to the fact that most of their exports are also imports going through its harbors. We address
the issue of monopoly power and re-exporting in a specification where we replace nitrate with
copper for Chile, and where we drop the Netherlands from our sample of countries.
24We refer the reader to the Global Finance database, available online at
http://eh.net/database/global-finance/, for further details on these data, in particular,
the series “Share of foreign debt serviced in gold or gold currency (%)”. See also Bordo and
Meissner (2006) for an analysis of the incidence of original sin in the periphery. The reduction
of the real value of government-debt payments is related to the literature on the “Twin D’s”:
default and devaluation (Calvo, 1988; Aguiar et al. (2013); Corsetti and Dedola (2016); Na et
al. (2014)). Even though we focus on the reduction of real debt payments, it should be noted
that there are other potential sources of inflation-related revenues, such as seigniorage and the
reduction of real payments of nominal government contracts (e.g., public wages). See Burnside
et al. (2001) and Burnside et al. (2006) for theoretical and empirical analysis of these alternative
mechanisms in the late 1990s Asian Crisis.
25Although copper is not Chile’s principal export, it is more exogenous than Chile’s most
important commodity export at the time, nitrate. The unconditional correlation coefficient
between currency risk and the growth rate of the price of nitrate is 0.02, and not significantly
different from zero between 1870 and 1913.
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principal export is -0.05 and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The
correlation between currency risk and the price of the second main export is -0.04
and significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Figure 2: Currency risk (solid line on right axis) and yearly export-price growth
for copper (dotted line on left axis) and nitrate (dashed line on left axis) for Chile.
Chile’s abandonment of gold in the 1890s, one of the few exits from a hard
peg during the classical gold standard era, shows how negative export-price shocks
contribute to the breaking of a peg and how this is captured by measured currency
risk. Chile had rejoined the gold standard on June 1, 1895, only to abandon it
three years later in July 1898. In this period, Chile suffered a number of negative
shocks, including a border dispute with Argentina that resulted in an arms race
and an increased defense budget; however, Collier and Sater (1996) stress the role
of export-price shocks in making a bad situation worse.
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Figure 3: Currency risk (solid line on right axis, measured in basis points), Nitrate
price index (dashed line on left axis, average 1913 = 100). Adherence to gold
(shaded area) is also plotted.
Figure 3 plots our measure of currency risk (solid line) together with the price
index for nitrate, Chile’s most important export by value. Chile’s adherence to
the gold standard is also plotted. Between June 1895 and July 1898, we can see
that the price of nitrate fell by 11.5%. The price of copper, Chile’s second most
important export, also decreased 3% between May 1898 and July 1898. Unsur-
prisingly, currency risk peaked just as Chile abandoned gold, while its exchange
rate devalued from 13.64 pesos per pound between 1897-1898 to 16.55 pesos per
pound in 1899.
3.2 Structural analysis
In this section we investigate if currency risk is related to the price of exports
using a specification derived directly from our theoretical model. Our model es-
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tablished that, everything else equal, permanent, negative price shocks increase
currency risk, while permanent, positive price shocks decrease currency risk. The
structural specification can be obtained by taking a first-order Taylor approxima-
tion of equation (10):
CRSt (Pt) =
ρS−1
S
(
Pt
PF
)X
1− S−1
S
(
Pt
PF
)X ≈ ρS − 1S
(
Pt
P F
)X
, (15)
when CRS is relatively small.26 This equation can then be estimated for each
country using non-linear least squares:
CRSt = αP
X
t + t, (16)
where t stands for month-year, α = ρS−1
S
(
P F
)−X
and, according to the theoretical
model, X < 0.27
In our baseline specifications, we report results using the raw data instead of
extracting permanent components of prices. This approach is conservative in the
sense that any bias goes against finding a relationship between export prices and
currency risk. Moreover, it is relatively more transparent than transforming the
26We opt for the first order approximation instead of estimating equation (10) directly due to
the discontinuity in this equation when the denominator approaches zero.
27In the model we assumed that after a country leaves the peg, its currency devalues. For some
countries measured currency risk is occasionally slightly negative which in the model would be
consistent with an expected appreciation of the currency following an exit. In other words, our
coefficient α would change sign. This coefficient instability poses a challenge for our estimation in
countries with a higher proportion of negative currency risk. Countries in our core are more likely
to experience negative currency risk: France (282 observations), Belgium (213), Netherlands
(210), Germany (194). Countries with 51-100 observations of negative currency risk: Switzerland,
Norway, Austria-Hungary, United States and Denmark; Countries with 1-50 observations of
negative currency risk: Finland, India, Italy, Romania, Russia, Sweden.
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data.28
Table 3 collects the estimated parameter X for each country, together with
its robust standard error. Countries are rank-ordered by the magnitude of this
coefficient, which according to the model, should be smaller than zero. We can
see that for most countries in our sample, and especially for those located in the
periphery, this coefficient is indeed smaller than zero and, particularly for countries
in the periphery, statistically different from zero.29
Although this exercise confirms a crucial result from the model, it does not take
into account omitted variables affecting all countries simultaneously, or whether
having a formal commitment to gold plays a role. To investigate these issues, we
obtain a linear specification by applying logs to both sides of equation (15):
log (CRSc,t) ≈ log (ρ) + log
(
Sc − 1
Sc
)
+Xclog (Pc,t)−Xclog
(
P Fc
)
, (17)
where c corresponds to country, t stands for month-year, ρ is the risk free rate, Sc−1
Sc
captures country-specific devaluation following the peg, Pc,t captures the price of
the main export and P Fc captures the country-specific price of exports at which the
government floats the currency. Assuming that ρ, X and P F are time-invariant,
as in the model, this equation can be estimated on our full panel of countries as:
28In our theoretical model we assume that export-price growth follows a random walk, which
has a unit root. We discuss this and other issues associated with non-stationary of our data in
Section 4.
29The coefficient X for France stands out as a clear outlier. Most of France’s currency risk
observations are of negative currency risk. Performing a sample split for France on this dimension,
we obtain that this coefficient is 0.08 for positive currency risk observations (115), and 0.7 for
negative currency risk observations (282). Estimated α coefficients are positive throughout, with
the exception of France, when currency risk is negative, and Belgium.
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Country X coefficient Robust Standard Error Core
France 3.33*** 0.45 X
USA 0.78*** 0.30 X
Bulgaria 0.21*** 0.08
Italy 0.11 0.27
Chile 0.02 0.10
Russia 0.01 0.10
Mexico -0.09 0.33
Netherlands -0.12 1.53 X
Belgium -0.24 1.49 X
Germany -0.46 0.72 X
Norway -0.55*** 0.20
Denmark -0.74*** 0.26
Finland -0.76*** 0.19
Japan -0.96*** 0.15
Sweden -1.04*** 0.18
Argentina -1.32*** 0.06
Romania -1.40*** 0.12
Greece -1.45*** 0.10
India -1.68*** 0.36
Austria-Hungary -1.94*** 0.26
Switzerland -2.65*** 0.46 X
Table 3: Country-by-country regression of CRSt on the principal-export price us-
ing non-linear least squares as defined in equation (16). Coefficient α not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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log (CRSc,t) = α + γc + βlog (Pc,t) + c,t, (18)
where the country fixed effect γc captures all the time-invariant country and
product-specific factors.30
For some countries, in particular those in the core, measured currency risk is
occasionally slightly negative. Applying logs would yield in a number of missing
observations (1677 of 8901). Thus, in our main structural panel specification, we
follow Burbidge et al. (1988) and take the inverse hyperbolic sine of currency risk:
H(CRSc,t) =
log
[
θCRSc,t +
(
θ2CRS2c,t + 1
)0.5]
θ
, (19)
where θ = 1.31 Unlike the log, this transformed variable is also defined at zero and
at negative values. With the exception of values close to zero, it is approximately
equal to log (2CRSc,t) and can be interpreted similarly as the log. Alternative ways
of dealing with negative observations, such as, adding a constant to the currency
risk premia so that it is always positive, or truncating the data to observations for
which currency risk is greater than zero, both yield similar estimates.
Table 4 collects the results of estimating the specification given by equation
(18), adding year fixed effects. All regressions include country fixed effects and
have standard errors clustered at the country level. Column (1) of Table 4 shows
the coefficients of the regression of currency risk on export prices, when we absorb
exclusively time-invariant country fixed effects. Looking at column (1) of Table 4,
30Note that the model implies that our slopes β are country specific. Wooldridge (2005) shows
that traditional country fixed-effects methods can be used to estimate the population-averaged
β, even if slopes are country-specific and correlated with covariates.
31θ is a dampening parameter and results are robust to using alternative values for θ. See
Carroll et al. (2003) for an application in the household finance literature and further discussion.
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we can see that, on average, when a country’s principal-export price decreases by
10%, currency risk rises by 5.6%. This effect is significantly different from zero at
the 1% level, but reduced in magnitude when controlling for year fixed effects.32
Specifications in columns (3)-(6) include year fixed effects and allow the β coef-
ficient to differ depending on whether an economy is part of the core or periphery.
As noted above, this latter distinction is potentially important because the periph-
eral countries have less diversified production structures and are also more likely
to be price-takers in world markets. Column (3) thus shows interactions between
the price of the principal export and a dummy variable that takes the value of
1 if the country is in the core, and zero otherwise, such that the coefficient on
the export price alone captures our coefficient of interest for the periphery. As
expected, the coefficient of interest is negative for the periphery but not for the
core countries. In particular, we find that a 10% decrease in the price index of
the principal export in the periphery causes an increase of 2.8% in currency risk
spreads.
Since our model examines currency risk from the perspective of abandoning a
peg, column (4) explicitly takes this into account by interacting export prices with
a dummy variable capturing the period when a country was adhering to the gold
standard.33 For the periphery, it is possible to see that formally pegging to gold
makes the causal impact of prices stronger, as the coefficient β is further reduced.
In columns (5) and (6), we perform our regression on two sub-samples, in and out
32We obtain effects of similar magnitude if we censor observations to be positive (5%), or if
we add a constant to all currency risk spreads, such that they are always positive (2.6%).
33If there are some benefits to smoothing exchange rates, a similar mechanism to the one we
modeled may also operate outside of a formal currency peg. In particular, note that countries
can shadow the gold standard even if they do not explicitly adopt it. Dates of gold-standard
adherence are collected in Table 11.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On Gold Not on Gold
Export price -0.56*** -0.12 -0.28* -0.27 -0.30 -0.32*
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16)
Export price x Core 0.66** 1.50*** 0.74** 1.36***
(0.27) (0.26) (0.29) (0.35)
Gold 0.27
(0.68)
Export price x Gold -0.03
(0.16)
Core x Gold 3.85***
(1.27)
Export price x Core x Gold -0.84***
(0.28)
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Constant 3.60*** 0.94 0.83 -0.32 0.62 2.49***
(0.72) (0.81) (0.82) (1.01) (0.78) (0.78)
Observations 8,901 8,901 8,901 8,901 5,926 2,975
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 16
Table 4: Regression of H(CRSc,t) on the log of principal-export price, where
H(CRSc,t) is defined in equation (19). Core takes on a value of 1 for the core
countries, zero otherwise. Gold takes on a value of 1 if the country has a formal
gold commitment in place, zero otherwise. x represents interaction. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country
level.
of gold. We can see that the effect for peripheral countries is of similar magnitude
across samples.
Our theoretical model highlights the role of export-price shocks in determining
currency risk, and the corresponding empirical estimates confirm the main predic-
tion of the model. That said, currency traders of the late 19th century may have
factored in other country-specific, time-varying factors when assessing the dura-
bility of gold standard pegs that are not captured in the empirical estimates of
the structural model. Furthermore, the structural estimation assumes that export
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price shocks are permanent, which may not necessarily be the case. To investigate
these issues further, in the next subsection we explore a reduced-form empirical
approach to study the relationship between export prices and currency risk.
3.3 Reduced form analysis
Our reduced form empirical model can be specified according to the following
equation:
CRSc,t = α + φt + µc + βXc,t + γZc,t + c,t, (20)
where CRSc,t represents currency risk spreads, c corresponds to country, t stands
for month-year, φt captures time fixed effects, µc summarizes country fixed effects,
Xc,t refers to measures of the price of the principal export, and finally Zc,t contains
country controls that vary monthly or annually. We test if β is less than zero, which
according to the model, would suggest a negative relationship between export
prices and currency risk. In our baseline specification, we begin by examining the
annual movements in currency risk and export prices and regress currency risk on
the annual growth rate in the price of the principal export.34
Table 5 reports the coefficients of regressions of average currency risk at year y
(measured in basis points) on the annual growth rate of the average export price
in the same year y and measured in percentage points. Column (1) shows that the
average effect across countries is negative but small, and not statistically different
34The yearly growth rate of export prices has been used in applied research that explores
variation from exogenous commodity prices (See, for example, Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and
Caselli and Tesei (2016)). Furthermore, it makes less restrictive assumptions on the permanent
nature of export price shocks. One-month fluctuations in the level of export prices may not be
sufficient to affect currency risk in the market, perhaps because they are the consequence of other
temporary shocks; one-year growth rates are more likely to capture permanent changes in prices.
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from zero. On the other hand, once we introduce the core-periphery distinction in
our sample, column (2) shows that a 10 percentage point decrease in the growth
rate of the price of the principal export of a country in the periphery is associated
with an increase of average currency risk of about 10 basis points. This effect is also
present when we consider one-year lagged growth in prices as in column (3), and
it is magnified when controlling for past growth in export prices as demonstrated
in columns (4) and (5).35
Although there are reasons one might prefer the annual estimates, Table 6
reports on similar specifications, but using changes in monthly prices of principal
exports. We regress the level of currency risk on the one year percent change in
prices, both measured at the end of the month. As shown in columns (1) and
(2), the coefficient of interest for the periphery remains negative and statistically
different from zero at least at the 10% level. As discussed above, we are also
interested on whether the mechanism is stronger with or without a currency peg.
In column (3), we allow for interactions between gold, core and the price of export.
For the periphery, it is possible to see that adhering to gold increases the causal
impact of prices on currency risk since the coefficient on export prices interacted
with gold is also negative. Summing the coefficients for price growth and price
growth interacted with gold in the periphery, we obtain a coefficient of -0.68, which
is significantly different from zero at the 1% level according to a joint significance
test. This coefficient implies that, on average, a one standard deviation in the
35If we do not control for year fixed effects, the effect size is even larger, up to 24 basis points
following a 10 percentage point decrease in the growth rate of the principal-export price. Note
that our measure of currency risk is relative to the UK short-term open market rate, such that
any common shocks affecting the UK and the countries in our sample are already captured
without year fixed effects. In this context, year fixed effects capture any common shocks to all
countries, except the UK.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Export-price growth -0.33 -0.96*** -1.04*** -1.16***
(0.32) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28)
Export-price growth x Core 1.83*** 1.91*** 2.24***
(0.50) (0.51) (0.44)
Export-price growthy−1 -0.85** -0.86** -1.00**
(0.32) (0.32) (0.40)
Export-price growthy−1#Core 1.07** 1.03** 1.53***
(0.51) (0.47) (0.41)
Export-price growthy−2 -0.45
(0.44)
Export-price growthy−2#Core 0.99*
(0.55)
Export-price growthy−3 -0.33
(0.32)
Export-price growthy−3#Core 1.69**
(0.67)
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Constant 106.59*** 98.90*** 353.65*** 358.48*** 364.74***
(31.86) (31.74) (33.74) (32.89) (31.51)
Observations 741 741 729 729 704
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21
Table 5: Regression of average currency risk at year y (measured in basis points)
on the annual growth rate of the average export price at year y. Core takes on
a value of 1 for the core countries, zero otherwise. x represents interaction. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the country level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
On Gold Not on Gold
Export-price growth -0.80** -0.44* -0.19 -0.54*** -0.08
(0.38) (0.24) (0.40) (0.19) (0.41)
Export-price growth x Core 0.52 1.03** 0.78 1.05*** 0.31
(0.44) (0.39) (0.63) (0.34) (0.72)
Gold -1.68
(21.31)
Export-price growth x Gold -0.49
(0.38)
Core x Gold 22.98
(31.15)
Export-price growth x Core x Gold 0.48
(0.56)
Year fixed effects X X X X
Constant 197.20*** 88.18*** 81.05*** 114.27*** 326.71***
(0.31) (26.96) (26.44) (3.75) (10.22)
Observations 8,748 8,748 8,748 5,878 2,870
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.31
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 16
Table 6: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on the
yearly growth rate of the principal-export monthly price. Core takes on a value of
1 for the core countries, zero otherwise. Gold takes on a value of 1 if the country
has a formal gold commitment in place, zero otherwise. x represents interaction.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the country level.
yearly growth of the price of the principal export (14.7%), increases currency risk
in the periphery, while adhering to gold, by about 10 basis points. In columns
(4) and (5), we alternatively examine the sub-samples in and out of gold. They
show that the effect of export prices is stronger when peripheral countries formally
adhere to gold.
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3.4 Discussion
Our empirical analysis suggests a causal mechanism through which exogenous
fluctuations of export prices affect currency risk. Our identifying assumptions are
that: (i) countries specialize in different products due to pre-determined factor
endowments and (ii) the prices of these products are determined in world markets
and therefore exogenous to price-taking countries.
Although we find statistically significant estimates, the quantitative impact
of export price changes on currency risk are relatively small. However, given our
estimation strategy, this is not surprising for two reasons. First, our results capture
the effect of the principal export on currency risk, but countries often export a
range of products, and their relative importance can change over time. Since we
hold the principal export fixed for every country in our sample, our estimates likely
understate the the “true” effect.36 Second, we are not attempting to explain the
cross-sectional variation of currency risk, which depends, among other things, on
the constant mean and volatility of the export-price series, but instead identify
the causal impact of realized export prices. We take a conservative approach that
controls for country and year fixed effects together with standard errors clustered
at the country level, and find that the principal-export price has a causal impact
on currency risk, particularly for the periphery, as well as when countries formally
adhered to gold.
36For example, as discussed in appendix B, although butter is the main export for Denmark
in our full sample, before 1890 flour represented a larger share of Danish exports.
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4 Extensions and robustness checks
In this section, we extend our empirical analysis to consider the boom-bust
nature of commodity prices, and report on a battery of robustness checks, includ-
ing investigating the role of lagged effects and monthly growth rates, as well as
additional country-specific covariates.
We follow the methodology in Jacks (2013) and identify whether a particular
export is experiencing a price boom or bust using the Christiano and Fitzgerald
(2003) band-pass filter. We decompose the time-series of export prices to extract
the cyclical component and create monthly dummies to capture booms and busts
in export prices.37 Table 7 collects the results for peripheral countries under the
gold standard and shows that export-price booms are associated with decreases
in currency risk while export-price busts are associated with increases in currency
risk. These coefficients are larger than our baseline results, but in our regression
with standard errors clustered at the country level, not very precisely estimated.38
Column (3) allows for the interaction of booms or busts in the two main exports.
It shows that simultaneous busts in the prices of the two most important exports
cause an increase in currency risk of 71 basis points, while simultaneous booms
cause a decrease in currency risk of 44 basis points. An F-test for the joint sig-
nificance of simultaneous bust events rejects that these are different from zero
at the 5% statistical significance level, while we can not reject that simultane-
ous boom events have no impact on currency risk at standard levels of statistical
37We look at deviations from the medium-run cycle in logged prices for export, subtract sample
mean of deviations and divide by their standard deviations, to obtain a standardized measure of
short-run deviations. A boom is identified as a deviation that is above the threshold of the 10
% tail of a normal distribution, a bust has a symmetric definition.
38Coefficients for the core countries are small and not statistically different from zero.
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(1) (2) (3)
Principal-export price boom -6.28 -12.92 -9.37
(17.87) (14.30) (14.51)
Second-export price boom -19.19 -16.36
(26.16) (29.88)
Principal-export price boom x Second-export price boom -18.18
(36.86)
Principal-export price bust 23.19** 22.67* 8.64
(10.68) (12.33) (12.46)
Second-export price bust 10.88 -0.28
(16.13) (17.18)
Principal-export price bust x Second-export price bust 62.92
(38.43)
Constant 199.60*** 202.76*** 203.65***
(2.17) (4.03) (4.15)
Observations 3,503 3,401 3,401
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.01
Number of countries 15 15 15
Table 7: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on
dummy variables that capture booms and busts in export prices. Only periphery
countries during the Gold Standard. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level.
significance.39
To understand how price shocks are transmitted into currency risk we exploit
the time-series dimension in the data and regress currency risk spreads (measured
in basis points) on the monthly growth rate of the principal-export price, including
up to 12 lags. Results are reported in Table 8. Column (1) reports β coefficients
pooled for core and periphery while columns (2) and (3) allow the β coefficient to be
different between core and periphery (core coefficients not reported). Additionally,
column (3) uses only observations for countries that are on the gold standard at
39There are some limited occurrences of booms in one main export, and busts in the other.
Controlling for the full set of interactions does not change the results.
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time t. The main message of this table is that all the lagged monthly growth
rates in export prices negatively impact currency risk levels at t. An F-test that
these monthly growth rates are all equal to zero is rejected at the 1% level. These
export-price effects are stronger when focusing on periphery countries, and even
stronger when focusing on periphery countries that adhere to gold.
Table 9 reports similar regressions, but considers up to 6 lags and 6 leads. We
can use these results to perform a simple falsification test since leads of the monthly
growth of prices should not be related to past currency risk. Again, all the lag
coefficients are negative. Some of the lead coefficients are initially negative, but
turn zero after 3 months. Focusing on countries in the periphery that adhere to
gold, we can see that lag coefficients are larger and more precisely estimated than
lead coefficients, particularly for lags longer than 2 months, and that leads from 3
months onwards are not significantly different from zero. We find that, even after
controlling for leads, lags of export-price growth have a causal impact on currency
risk, while leads do not cause currency risk. These results are consistent with our
theory and other empirical results for the relationship between export prices and
currency risk.40
As a further robustness check, we augment our baseline model and include
institutional variables, country-specific events and macroeconomics variables that
may also be drivers of currency-risk spreads. Although some of these may be of
interest in their own right, we see them as conditioning variables and do not take
a stand on whether they are endogenous or exogenous. Crucially, if export prices
40The fact that lags and leads close to t are of similar magnitude may indicate measurement
error in the historical price series, auto-correlation on the monthly price growth series, or both.
We see it as an additional reason to focus on yearly growth rates as we did in the baseline
specifications outlined in Section 3.3.
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(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Core vs Periphery Core vs Periphery on Gold
Export-price growtht -0.04 -0.35 -0.39
(0.20) (0.26) (0.29)
Export-price growtht−1 -0.04 -0.44 -0.80
(0.35) (0.45) (0.53)
Export-price growtht−2 -0.25 -0.63 -1.09*
(0.42) (0.54) (0.53)
Export-price growtht−3 -0.30 -0.78 -1.31**
(0.43) (0.54) (0.50)
Export-price growtht−4 -0.32 -0.82* -1.33***
(0.37) (0.40) (0.33)
Export-price growtht−5 -0.31 -0.61* -0.97***
(0.28) (0.32) (0.21)
Export-price growtht−6 -0.37 -0.64 -0.60*
(0.34) (0.41) (0.34)
Export-price growtht−7 -0.16 -0.29 -0.34
(0.34) (0.39) (0.39)
Export-price growtht−8 -0.26 -0.50 -0.39
(0.34) (0.39) (0.33)
Export-price growtht−9 -0.01 -0.45 -0.42
(0.32) (0.36) (0.30)
Export-price growtht−10 -0.33 -0.72** -0.79**
(0.28) (0.31) (0.35)
Export-price growtht−11 0.02 -0.37 -0.49*
(0.26) (0.30) (0.26)
Export-price growtht−12 -0.18 -0.41 -0.60
(0.23) (0.29) (0.41)
Year fixed effects X X X
Constant 87.75*** 89.42*** 113.07***
(27.59) (26.70) (3.08)
Observations 8,732 8,732 5,870
Number of countries 21 21 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.23
Table 8: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on
the monthly growth rate of the principal-export price. Columns 2 and 3 allow the
β coefficient to be different if country is part of the periphery or the core (core
coefficients not reported). Column 3 uses only observations for countries that are
on the Gold Standard at t. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the country level.
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(1) (2)
Core vs Periphery Core vs Periphery on Gold
Export-price growtht -0.41 -0.44
(0.29) (0.37)
Export-price growtht−1 -0.39 -0.71
(0.45) (0.55)
Export-price growtht−2 -0.56 -0.97*
(0.51) (0.54)
Export-price growtht−3 -0.67 -1.13**
(0.48) (0.49)
Export-price growtht−4 -0.70* -1.12***
(0.35) (0.34)
Export-price growtht−5 -0.52** -0.85***
(0.24) (0.16)
Export-price growtht−6 -0.60** -0.54**
(0.28) (0.20)
Export-price growtht+1 -0.52* -0.57*
(0.27) (0.28)
Export-price growtht+2 -0.82*** -0.80***
(0.23) (0.28)
Export-price growtht+3 -0.36 -0.32
(0.28) (0.28)
Export-price growtht+4 0.21 0.49
(0.26) (0.35)
Export-price growtht+5 0.32 0.42
(0.29) (0.28)
Export-price growtht+6 0.25 0.24
(0.29) (0.23)
Year fixed effects X X
Constant 89.48*** 495.08***
(27.52) (7.57)
Observations 8,692 5,792
Number of countries 21 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.23
Table 9: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on
the monthly growth rate of the principal-export price. Columns 1 and 2 allow
the β coefficient to be different if country is part of the periphery or the core
(core not reported). Column 2 uses only observations for countries that are on the
Gold Standard at t. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the country level.
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are exogenous, these variables should not affect our coefficient of interest. We
include monthly dummies that capture conflict (civil and foreign wars), whether
a country has a central bank or a stock market, or whether it is experiencing
default. As Table 15 in appendix C shows, the coefficient of export prices is
relatively unchanged.41
Finally, we include data on the trade balance and on the government bond
spread over consols from Ferguson and Schularick (2006). It may be important
to control for the former as negative shocks to export prices may lead to a de-
terioration of the trade balance. Under a formal commitment to gold, this may
put pressure on the gold reserves and make leaving a peg more likely. Controlling
for the spread of government bonds over consols may also be important since it
allows us to explicitly test whether our measure for currency risk is capturing an
effect independent of country or political risk. Given that these data vary at the
yearly level, we augment our annual data specification reported in Table 4. Table
10 shows that the relationship between trade balance and currency risk is nega-
tive, but the coefficient for the growth rate in the price of exports is not sensitive
to the inclusion of these controls, and even more precisely estimated than before.
The coefficient for the spread of government bonds is not significantly different
from zero in all specifications, suggesting that currency risk is not explained by
sovereign-bond spreads. In column (5), we also control for reserves as a share
of GDP using data from Accominotti et al. (2011). Unsurprisingly, reserves are
an important determinant of currency-risk spreads. However, our coefficient of
interest is again unchanged.
In appendix C, we further show that our results are also robust to using desea-
41See Mitchener and Weidenmier (2015) for details and sources for these variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Export-price growth -0.88** -0.89** -1.81*** -0.78** -0.75*
(0.31) (0.35) (0.51) (0.35) (0.39)
Export-price growth x Core 1.62* 2.08** 1.80*** 1.95** 1.16*
(0.80) (0.73) (0.52) (0.71) (0.59)
Trade balance % of exports -0.26 -0.41 -0.50
(0.25) (0.38) (0.29)
Sovereign bond spread 0.00 0.19 0.01
(0.08) (0.16) (0.09)
Reserves % of GDP -12.90***
(3.34)
Year fixed effects X X X X
Constant 266.19*** 227.71*** 216.89*** 223.74*** 213.41***
(24.46) (29.12) (34.22) (29.63) (19.14)
Observations 499 417 417 417 402
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.46 0.61
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 13
Table 10: Regression of the level of currency risk on the annual growth rate of the
principal-export price. The dummy variable Core takes on a value of 1 for the core
countries identified in Table 2, zero otherwise. x represents an interaction. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the country level.
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sonalized price series, removing near monopolists and famous re-exporters, aug-
menting the number of exports, adding principal imports for each country, and
allowing estimated coefficients on export prices to differ across manufactures and
commodity exporters.
5 Conclusion
We show theoretically and empirically that export-price shocks affect the ex-
pectation of currency devaluation. Using a simple model of strategic exit from a
hard peg, we show that export prices are negatively related to the risk of “pegxit”
and currency devaluation. The intuition behind our main theoretical result is
that negative export-price shocks decrease government revenues, making it more
likely that the government devalues domestic currency in order to decrease real
debt-service payments, and ease fiscal pressures.
We test for the existence of this mechanism during the classical gold standard
era, a period when hard pegs were the very foundation of the international mone-
tary system. Under the identifying assumption that world prices are exogenous for
price-taking economies, we find a negative causal relationship between the price
of exports and currency risk, that is consistent with our theoretical results. This
negatively-signed relationship is driven by countries on the periphery, and the
effects are stronger when countries adhered to the gold standard.
Our model suggests several interesting extensions that could be pursued in
future work. On the production side, we assumed long-run flexible prices and
that devaluation decreases tax revenues from economic activity related to trade.
Although these two assumptions are consistent with the classical gold standard
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era, it would be interesting to incorporate price-stickiness into the model and to
study the mechanism through which currency devaluation can affect economic
activity. Another interesting avenue for future research is to consider banks and
firms balance-sheet currency mismatches, that can turn a currency devaluation
into a banking crises.
Some of these extensions lend themselves to empirical work within the classical
gold standard era. We have focused our empirical analysis on the principal export
for each country. Although this was motivated by our theoretical approach as well
as our desire to identify causal effects using an exogenous source of identification,
including the full portfolio of exports and imports would allow us to assess the
magnitude of the impact of trade shocks on currency risk. Finally, we have taken a
partial equilibrium perspective on currency risk, where countries take international
prices for their exports as given, and focused on shocks that propagate through
trade. Besides participating in a global goods market for their exports, countries
in the gold standard were linked also through imports as well as immigration and
capital flows. In future work, we plan to study these relationships further.
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Appendix A Periods of gold standard adherence
Country Gold dates
Argentina 1870m1 - 1876m6*, 1883m7 -1885m1 and 1899m11 - 1914m6
Austria-Hungary 1892m8 - 1914m6
Belgium 1878m11 - 1914m6
Bulgaria 1902m11 - 1912m10
Chile 1895m6 - 1898m7
Denmark 1873m5 - 1914m6
Finland 1877m12 - 1914m6
France 1878m11 - 1914m6
Germany 1871m10 - 1914m6
Greece 1885m1 - 1885m8*, 1910m3 - 1914m6
India 1898m1 - 1914m6
Italy 1883m2 - 1894m12
Japan 1897m9 - 1914m6
Mexico 1905m4 - 1913m12
Netherlands 1875m6 - 1914m6
Norway 1873m5 - 1914m6
Romania 1890m4 - 1914m6
Russia 1897m1 - 1914m6
Sweden 1873m5 - 1914m6
Switzerland 1878m12 - 1914m6
USA 1879m1 - 1914m6
Table 11: De jure gold adherence dates are fromMitchener and Weidenmier (2015),
except * from Eichengreen et al. (2005).
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Appendix B Prices and principal exports
In this Appendix, we describe the sources and calculations used to create our
series for principal exports and export prices.
B.1 Price series notes
We collected a number of monthly price series for different products from the
Economist ’s Monthly Trade Supplement and Weekly Price Current. We select the
price series that maximizes data coverage and consistency throughout our sample
(1870-1913). This is important as some price series change units or definitions.42
We also use a price index for British textile exports from Silverman (1930) that is
available between 1880 - 1913 to proxy for cotton and wool manufactures.43 We
create price indices for each relevant product-price series that take on the value
of 100 for the average of the 1913 price. We select 1913 as our base year because
the initial date for which we have data varies across goods whereas this date is
available for all goods. The list below provides details on the particular price series
taken from the Economist (as displayed therein):
Beef : Inferior.
Butter : Prices series for Dutch (including Friesland) and Danish butter.
Coal : Best Wallsend London.
42We have confirmed that our empirical results hold in sub-samples that exclude any product
definitional changes.
43Since the main source of monthly variation in cotton and wool textiles would come from
changes in the prices of the commodity input, it is not surprising that our empirical results are
robust to proxying the price of cotton manufactures with a cotton price index that is available
between 1870 and 1914 (the monthly correlation between the cotton index and the monthly index
for textile products price index is 0.76), and the price of wool manufactures with a wool price
index that is available between 1870 and 1914 (the monthly correlation between the price of wool
and the price of textile products is 0.78.).
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Coffee: Between 1870-1881, Jamaica Fine Ord. to Fine. Between 1881-1913,
Ceylon, Plantation. Low mid changed to Santos Good Average in 1908.
Copper : Between 1870-1881, Copper: Tough Cake. Between 1881-1913, Chili
Bars changed to G.M.B in 1899, Standard in 1912.
Cotton: Between 1870-1881, Mule No 40, Fair, 2nd quality, Manchester Markets.
Between 1881-1913, Yarn-40 Mule Twist.
Flax : Between 1870-1881, Friesland. Between 1881-1913, Petersburg 12-head,
changed to Riga, ZK in 1895.
Flour : Town Made 2ends, changed to Town House holds in 1910.
Hemp: Between 1870-1881, Manilla. Between 1881-1913, St Petersburg Clean
Raw.
Iron: British mid.
Lead : English Pig.
Nitrate: Saltpetre English refined.
Oats : Gazette Averages (English Grain) - Oats.
Olive Oil : Between 1870-1881, Olive, Gallipoli. After 1881, Olive Levant/ After
1885 changed to Spanish, 1911 to Palm. Lagos.
Rice: Rangoon.
Silver : London market price.
Silk : Between 1870-1881, Raw Cossimbuzar. Between 1881-1913, Cossimbuzar.
Sugar : Between 1870-1881, Bengal Good Yellow and White. Between 1881-1902,
West India Refining. Between 1902-1913, West India Syrups.
Timber : Prices series for Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish timber from the
Weekly Price Current.
Tea: Tea Congou - 1905 changed to Fr. Gd..
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Textiles : Average export prices from foreign trade statistics for cotton cloth,
woolen and worsted yarn and goods, and for linen and jute piece goods.
Wheat : Between 1870-1881, Wheat Gazette Average. Between 1881-1913,
Gazette Averages (English Grain).
Wood : Price series for Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish timber.
Wool : Sydney Unwashed/Changed to NS.Wles Greasy Average in 1891.
Wheat : Gazette Averages (English Grain) - Wheat.
B.2 Principal exports
For most countries in our sample, we primarily rely on detailed trade data pub-
lished in the British Board of Trade (various years) Statistical Abstract, henceforth
SA, to identify principal exports. We supplement and cross-check our estimates
with information found in Mitchell (2007b), Mitchell (1982), Hanson (1980), as
well as country-specific sources. Appendix Table 1 shows each economy’s largest
export for 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910 (when available). The list below sum-
marizes our findings:44
Argentina: Wool. Mitchell (2007b) reports that the average value of wool exports
for Argentina between 1870 and 1914 was 40.2 million gold pesos, compared to
35.7 million gold pesos for wheat and 22.4 million gold pesos for hides and skins.
According to SA, wool accounted between 49.9% of Argentina’s exports (1889)
and 19.9% in 1904.
Austria-Hungary : Wood. According to SA, wood is the largest export for
Austria-Hungary in our sample (largest export for 14 years). Sugar follows
44Imports and source data available on request.
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closely (11 years). Hanson (1980) reports that for 1900 the largest export for
Austria was raw sugar (37.9 million U.S. dollars), followed by cotton
manufactures (4.6 million U.S. dollars). Given that we do not have price data on
Austrian-Hungarian wood, we use the price of Swedish wood as a proxy.
Belgium: Flour. According to SA, flour is the largest export for Belgium in our
sample (largest export for 11 years), followed by coal and iron.
Bulgaria: Wheat. According to SA, wheat is consistently the largest export for
Bulgaria. Chirot (1991) reports that wheat sales represented 70% of Bulgaria’s
export totals around 1900.
Chile: Nitrate. Mitchell (2007b) reports that the average value of copper exports
between 1870 and 1914 was 29.6 million gold pesos of 18 pence, which is smaller
than the value of nitrate exports for the same period (125.4 million gold pesos of
18 pence).
Denmark : Butter. According to SA, flour and butter are the most representative
exports for Denmark. Flour accounts for a larger share of exports early in our
sample period, whereas butter dominates after 1890. We use the monthly price of
Dutch butter to proxy for Danish butter, for which we only have data from 1894
onwards. The correlation coefficient between Danish and Dutch butter following
1894 is 0.87.
Finland : Wood. Hjerppe (1989) report that timber and wood products
accounted for 46% of Finnish exports between 1869-1913.
France: Textile manufactures. According to SA, wool, silk and cotton
manufactures represent the largest exports for France, followed by wine and
hides. Hanson (1980) reports that for 1900 the largest export for France are silk
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manufactures (61.5 million U.S. dollars), followed by cotton manufactures (34.9
million U.S. dollars). Given that we do not have monthly data for France’s
textile manufactures we proxy the price of France’s largest export with an index
for textile products from Silverman (1930).
Germany : Iron products. According to SA, iron products are the largest export
for Germany for 13 years, followed by wool manufactures and flour. Hanson
(1980) reports that for 1900 the largest export for Germany are cotton
manufactures (67.1 million U.S. dollars), followed by raw sugar (51.5 million U.S.
dollars).
Greece: Iron. According to SA, the main export are dried fruits, for which we do
not have monthly price data, followed by ore (as high as 30% of exports in 1895).
Blattman et al. (2007) reports that fruits & nuts account for 59% of Greece’s
exports between 1898 and 1902. The second largest export is lead, accounting for
14.1%.
India: Cotton. Mitchell (1982) reports that the average value of cotton exports
between 1870 and 1913 was 167.3 million rupees. Rice accounts for the second
largest export, averaging 128.2 million rupees, followed by opium, jute, cotton
manufactures, tea and jute manufactures. Blattman et al. (2007) reports that
rice accounts for 21.1% of Indias’s exports between 1898 and 1902. Other
important exports include cotton (16.9%), cotton manufactures (13.8%), jute
(13.7%), tea (12.2%), opium (11.7%) and jute manufactures (10.6%).
Italy : Silk. SA reports that silk, raw and thrown waste cocoons account for the
largest share of Italy’s exports, followed by silk manufactures. Hanson (1980)
reports that for 1900 the largest export for Italy are silk manufactures (86.6
51
million U.S. dollars), followed by cotton manufactures (11.8 million U.S. dollars).
Japan: Silk. Mitchell (1982) reports that the average value of raw silk exports
between 1870 and 1913 was 46.15 million yen, followed by cotton yarn & fabrics
(25.9%) and silk fabrics (19%). We confirmed this using SA.
Mexico: Silver. Mitchell (2007b) reports that the average value of silver exports
between 1870 and 1913 was 52.5 million pesos, much larger than the second
largest export, coffee (6.7 million pesos).
Netherlands : Flour. SA reports that drugs are the largest export for the
Netherlands, followed by flour and wheat. Hanson (1980) reports that for 1900
the largest export for Netherlands are cotton manufactures (16.2 million U.S.
dollars), followed by Dyes and Dyestuffs (9.1 million dollars). Given that the
Netherlands monopolizes the market for Peruvian bark, we select flour as the
main export, for which we have monthly prices.
Norway : Wood. SA reports that wood and fish are the largest exports for
Norway. Blattman et al. (2007) reports that wood and products accounted for
44.2% of Norway’s exports between 1898 and 1902. Fish accounts for the largest
percentage of exports during this period (50.1%), but we do not have monthly
data for Norwegian fish and opt to use Norwegian timber instead.
Romania: Wheat. SA reports that wheat is the largest export for Romania,
followed by maize, barley and flax. Chirot (1991) reports that wheat sales
represented 80% of Romania’s export totals around 1900.
Russia: Wheat. SA reports that wheat is the largest export for Russia followed
by flax and barley. Blattman et al. (2007) reports that grain accounted for 63.0%
of Russia’s exports between 1898 and 1902, 65.0% between 1878 and 1882.
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Sweden: Wood. SA reports that wood is the largest export for Sweden, followed
by iron products, oats and butter. Johansson (1967) reports that, between 1891
and 1895, wood products accounted for 28% of Sweden’s exports.
Switzerland : Textile manufactures. SA reports that silk and cotton manufactures
represent the largest exports for Switzerland. Hanson (1980) reports that in 1900
the largest export for Switzerland are silk manufactures (40.7 million U.S.
dollars), closely followed by cotton manufactures (32.9 million U.S. dollars).
United States of America: Cotton. SA reports that cotton is the largest export
for the USA, followed by wheat and meat and sausages. Mitchell (2007b) reports
that the average value of cotton exports between 1870 and 1913 was 250 million
U.S. dollars, larger than the second largest export, wheat (averaging 108 million
U.S. dollars).
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Appendix C Additional empirical results
In this Appendix, we show that our results are also robust to the following
alternative specificaitons: using deseasonalized price series; removing near mo-
nopolists and famous re-exporters; augmenting the number of exports; adding
principal imports for each country; and allowing estimated coefficients on export
prices to differ across manufactures and commodity exporters.
Some of the monthly variation in commodity prices may reflect seasonality in
supply and demand and thus be predictable from the currency traders’ perspective.
Supply seasonality is associated with the natural growth or extraction calendars,
while demand seasonality comes from general economic activity. This seasonality
in international supply and demand may affect the price of exports for our countries
at the monthly frequency, but is not necessarily associated with the permanent
shocks we considered in our theoretical model, and therefore may not be causing
currency risk. As a consequence, using seasonally unadjusted data can potentially
bias the β coefficient estimated using the panel defined by equation (18). Table
12 reproduces the structural analysis from Table 4 but uses deseasonalized price
data. It shows that results are virtually unchanged.
In Table 13, we investigate the robustness of the reduced-form results by study-
ing more exogenous exports, but also a larger number of exports and imports. In
Column (1), we replace some of the main exports in Table 2 by main exogenous
exports. To be exact, we replace nitrate with copper for Chile and remove the
Netherlands from our sample. We can see that the effect size for the periphery is
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
On Gold Not on Gold
Export price -0.56*** -0.10 -0.24 -0.24 -0.27* -0.29*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
Export price x Core 0.61** 1.47*** 0.70** 1.31***
(0.27) (0.24) (0.29) (0.31)
Gold 0.13
(0.59)
Export price x Gold -0.00
(0.14)
Core x Gold 4.00***
(1.23)
Export price x Core x Gold -0.87***
(0.27)
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Constant 3.56*** 0.87 0.72 -0.43 0.56 2.78***
(0.68) (0.80) (0.80) (1.00) (0.71) (0.68)
Observations 8,901 8,901 8,901 8,901 5,926 2,975
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.25
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 16
Table 12: Regression of H(CRSc,t) on the log of principal export price (deseason-
alized), H(CRSc,t) defined in equation (19). Core takes on a value of 1 for the
core countries, zero otherwise. Gold takes on a value of 1 if the country has a
formal gold commitment in place, zero otherwise. x represents interaction. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the country level.
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robust to using more exogenous exports and to removing a notable re-exporter.45
In Column (2), we add the second largest export to the principal export identified
in Table 2, while in Column (3) we add the main import together with the princi-
pal export. Finally, in Column (4) we include the 3 main exports and the 3 main
imports. The coefficient on the primary export is negative throughout. In gen-
eral, only export-price growth coefficients are significantly different from zero for
the periphery, which is consistent with our focus on principal exports as a crucial
determinant of income and economic activity.
In Table 14, we allow the estimated coefficient on export-price growth to dif-
fer between manufactures and commodity exporters. Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland are classified as countries for which the
principal export is a manufacture while the remaining countries are commodity
exporters. The first line collects the results for commodity exporters. We can see
that the coefficient is negative throughout, and that the effect of export prices is
stronger while on gold. This negative coefficient is further reduced if we remove
the United States from the set of commodity exporters, or consider only periph-
ery countries. Finally, Table 15 reports that our results are robust to including
monthly dummies capturing institutional variables and country-specific events as
described in Section 4.
45We have also ran specifications removing other potential exporters with market power, for
example, the USA in the market for cotton, or Russia in the market for wheat, and found similar
results.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exogenous export-price growth -0.50**
(0.19)
Exogenous export-price growth x Core 1.22***
(0.35)
Export 1 price growth -0.39 -0.41 -0.44* -0.75**
(0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.29)
Export 1 price growth x Core 0.82* 0.92** 0.79* 1.15**
(0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.44)
Import 1 price growth -0.09 0.03 0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Import 1 price growth x Core 0.52*** 0.23 0.27
(0.16) (0.18) (0.33)
Export 2 price growth -0.24* -0.16 -0.10
(0.13) (0.10) (0.09)
Export 2 price growth x Core 0.73** 0.44 0.21
(0.29) (0.27) (0.37)
Import 2 price growth -0.30* -0.20
(0.16) (0.17)
Import 2 price growth x Core 0.58*** 0.39*
(0.20) (0.22)
Export 3 price growth -0.09
(0.12)
Export 3 price growth x Core 0.30
(0.36)
Import 3 price growth -0.16
(0.24)
Import 3 price growth x Core 0.36
(0.26)
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Constant 98.11*** 250.15*** 245.53*** 302.73*** 171.37***
(27.10) (40.36) (33.95) (8.20) (18.18)
Observations 8,374 8,359 8,447 7,877 6,854
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.30
Number of countries 20 21 21 21 19
Table 13: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on the
yearly growth rate of the principal exports and imports price, where 1 stands for
principal, 2 for second principal, and 3 for third principal. Core takes on a value of
1 for the core countries, zero otherwise. Gold takes on a value of 1 if the country
has a formal gold commitment in place, zero otherwise. x represents interaction.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the country level.
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(1) (2) (3)
Export-price growth -0.73* -0.30 -0.15
(0.37) (0.27) (0.40)
Export-price growth x Manufacture 0.34 0.67 0.01
(0.43) (0.41) (0.43)
Gold -0.62
(21.24)
Export-price growth x Gold -0.27
(0.49)
Manufacture x Gold -8.63
(34.90)
Export-price growth x Gold x Manufacture 0.79
(0.62)
Year fixed effects X X
Constant 197.17*** 86.70*** 239.17***
(0.30) (27.41) (23.52)
Observations 8,748 8,748 8,748
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.26 0.26
Number of countries 21 21 21
Table 14: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on the
yearly growth rate of the principal-export monthly price. Manufacture takes on
a value of 1 if principal export is a manufactured good, zero if it is a commodity.
Gold takes on a value of 1 if the country has a formal gold commitment in place,
zero otherwise. Core takes on a value of 1 for the core countries, zero otherwise. x
represents interaction. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses clustered at the country level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export-price growth -0.44* -0.44* -0.44* -0.42 -0.72* -0.42
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.38) (0.25)
Export-price growth x Core 1.03** 1.03** 1.03** 0.99** 0.45 0.99**
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.39)
Intra-state war 4.76 -8.89 3.41
(41.51) (43.31) (40.35)
Inter-state war -12.99 -9.21 -13.88
(31.97) (34.15) (32.29)
Central bank 0.05 -35.67** 0.06
(18.81) (16.86) (18.89)
Stock market 9.34 -9.16 8.66
(18.89) (25.57) (19.33)
Default 115.35 238.94*** 115.88*
(67.27) (60.55) (66.66)
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Constant 88.18*** 88.15*** 82.41*** 86.57*** 224.29*** 81.16***
(26.96) (26.88) (27.85) (27.08) (26.55) (28.00)
Observations 8,748 8,748 8,748 8,748 8,748 8,748
Adjusted R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.04 0.27
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
Table 15: Regression of the level of currency risk (measured in basis points) on
the yearly growth rate of the principal-export monthly price. The dummy variable
Core takes on a value of 1 for the core countries identified in Table 2, zero otherwise.
x represents an interaction. All regressions have country fixed effects, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country
level.
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